How underdogs win

The political scientist Ivan Arreguín-Toft recently looked at every war fought in the past two hundred years between strong- the Goliaths- and weak – the David’s- combatants. The Goliaths, he found, won in 71.5 per cent of the cases. That is a remarkable fact. But when the underdogs chose an unconventional strategy, David’s winning percentage went from 28.5 to 63.6.

But how exactly does an underdog like David win against the more powerful Goliath? There seem to be three major elements in these victories: one, alter the terms, rules and terrain of the conflict in your favor, two, develop superior energy and enthusiasm for results and finally, mobilize unique and unconventional approaches.

These have been known for a long time under the rubric of asymmetric warfare, where the tactical success of asymmetric warfare is dependent on at least some of the following assumptions:

• One side has a technological advantage which outweighs the numerical advantage of the enemy,
• Training and tactics which allow a smaller force to overcome a much larger one,
• unconventional tactics in which the superior power is weaker,
• using prohibited tactics to its advantage.

The genius of Gladwell is to show how these can strategies and tactics can work for underdogs everywhere, from a girl’s basketball team in California to the Viet Minh in the Vietnam War. Gladwell theorizes why Davids beat Goliaths: “Insurgents work harder than Goliath. But their other advantage is that they will do what is “socially horrifying”—they will challenge the conventions about how battles are supposed to be fought. All the things that distinguish the ideal basketball player are acts of skill and coördination. When the game becomes about effort over ability, it becomes unrecognizable—a shocking mixture of broken plays and flailing limbs and usually competent players panicking and throwing the ball out of bounds. You have to be outside the establishment—a foreigner new to the game or a skinny kid from New York at the end of the bench—to have the audacity to play it that way. George Washington couldn’t do it. His dream, before the war, was to be a British Army officer, finely turned out in a red coat and brass buttons. He found the guerrillas who had served the American Revolution so well to be “an exceeding dirty and nasty people.” He couldn’t fight the establishment, because he was the establishment.”
He describes in some detail the approach that Ranadive, the coach of a junior girl’s basketball team, took in taking this team to the finals- changing the conventional approach of using only half the basketball court by applying a full court press, understanding the time elements of the game and motivating his young charges with energy and enthusiasm.

The Viet Minh in Vietnam similarly defined the battle on their terms by avoiding full front attacks against a far superior equipped enemy by moving to guerilla tactics of attack and disappear. Their leadership shaped the conflict as one of national liberation thus mobilizing the entire country. And they designed tactics that constantly surprised the US forces ranging from the underground tunnels of Cu Chi to the Tet offensive. And they were willing to fight for ever against an opponent tired of the conflict ten thousand miles from their country.
In more recent times, the primary election campaign of Obama to win the nomination from the clear front runner Hillary Clinton is another example of an underdog using asymmetric warfare tactics for success. As a matter of fact, it is classic David Goliath story and the tactics teach us a lot. Clinton had the establishment support - so Obama never fought for their endorsements but went around them directly to the state level organizations. He doubted that he could win the big states without the democratic establishment support so he went to the small caucus states. He had no major donors so he went to the internet and sought small donations from those who had never participated in elections before. Since he did not have support of the big unions, he used social sites on the internet to mobilize volunteers for his effort. In short his was a brilliant strategy to win against a tougher, better known and better financed candidate with an insurgent candidacy.

In summary, what are the winning tactics of the underdog: The weaker power can only win if it aggressively defines the rules of the conflict in a way that disadvantages the stronger power. When underdogs choose not to play by Goliath’s rules, they win, according to Ivan Arreguín-Toft, “even when everything we think we know about power says they shouldn’t”. Insurgents must work harder, much harder, than the Goliaths. Davids can beat Goliaths by substituting effort for ability—and substituting effort for ability turns out to be a winning formula for underdogs in all walks of life. The biggest shaft in the underdogs arsenal is their ability to try completely different surprising tactics sometimes even sometimes doing what is “socially horrifying” to win. By refusing to be bound by conventional rule of conflict, they can obtain that crucial edge essential for success.